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NOTES
torney fees."1 The court now has the opportunity to provide the practicing
bar with the same type of clearly delineated procedure under which to handle
appeals. It should exercise that opportunity by amending the rule a fourth time.
Cindy Jo Percival
Water Law: Changes in Water Permit Application
After Ricks Exploration Co. v. Oklahoma Water
Resources Board-Were Vested Rights Lost?
The partnership between Oklahoma and its water resources is not unlike
excerpts from a bad marriage: the state has neglected it, abused it,
and-when it appeared the resource would leave-taken steps to try to
preserve it. The glimpses of this union between state and water provided by
legislative enactments and court cases comprise an interesting chapter in legal
history. A ruling by the Oklahoma Supreme Court, Ricks Exploration Co. v.
Oklahoma Water Resources Board,' and the reaction to it by the Oklahoma
legislature expand that chapter, and it is not yet finished.
Briefly, the Ricks court ruled that the Oklahoma Water Resources Board
(OWRB) erred in denying standing to a mineral lessee that sought a non-
domestic groundwater use permit under the existing water law of the state.
2
Thereafter, the legislature amended the statute in an apparent attempt to
deny mineral lessees standing for water permits, 3 in effect overruling Ricks.
This note discusses the history of Oklahoma water law4 and the Ricks
41. The rule specifically provides for the trial court's jurisdiction to decide the issue and
delay appeal until all issues are ruled upon.
1. 695 P.2d 498 (Okla. 1984).
2. Id. at 504. It should be noted that "standing" as used in Ricks differs from the usual ad-
ministrative law term. Normally, it indicates that those appealing an adverse agency decision
must meet certain requirements before a court will review the case. Here, it denotes prerequisites
for application to the Oklahoma Water Resources Board. 82 OKLA. STAT. § 1020.1 (1981).
3. 82 OKLA. STAT. § 1020.11(D) (Supp. 1985), as amended, reads:
Except as provided in Section 1020.21 of this title, no permits shall be issued to an
applicant who is not the surface owner of the land on which the well is to be
located, or does not hold a valid lease from such owner permitting withdrawal of
water from such basin or subbasin.
4. For a thorough discussion of water law history and the political process leading to the
present law, see Jensen, The Allocation of Percolating Water Under the Oklahoma Ground
Water Law of 1972, 14 TULSA L.J. 437 (1979); Rarick, Oklahoma Water Law, Stream and Sur-
face in the Pre-1963 Period, 22 OKLA. L. REV. 1 (1969); Rarick, Oklahoma Water Law, Stream
and Surface Under the 1963 Amendments, 23 OKLA. L. REv. 19 (1970); Rarick, Oklahoma
19871
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case.' It also examines the revised statute, the legislative intent behind it, and
its effect on water users. Most important, however, the note will attempt to
determine the statute's constitutionality.
Oklahoma Water Law
Oklahoma has embraced various water philosophies since statehood.
Charitably, this history has been described as "rather complicated." ' 6 By
statute, Oklahoma Territory in 1890 declared that the landowner was the
owner of all water flowing over or under his land, but not groundwater
forming a definite stream.' This absolute ownership doctrine, arising from
early English common law,8 has vestiges in present-day Oklahoma statutes.9
The absolute ownership theory was changed by case law in Canada v. City of
Shawnee'" to a reasonable use doctrine, a modification of the absolute
ownership doctrine," under which landowners may be liable for injuries aris-
ing from their groundwater withdrawals if their use is unreasonable. Such use
is unreasonable if it is wasteful or if it occurs on lands that do not overlie the
area from which the water was taken. The use is also unreasonable if it
prevents other users from enjoying their share of the water and they are in-
jured as a result.'I
Although there were earlier laws governing water use, the legislature first
regulated the use of groundwater in 1949.1 The statute restricted water
withdrawal to the landowner.'" Groundwater was owned by the surface
Water Law, Stream and Surface, The Water Conservation Storage Commission and the 1965
and 1967 Amendments, 24 OKLA. L. REV. 1 (1971); Rarick, Oklahoma Water Law, Ground or
Percolating Water in the Pre-1971 Period, 24 OKLA. L. REV. 403 (1971).
5. For a more in-depth analysis of the Ricks case, see Note, Mineral Lessee's Right to Fresh
Groundwater: Riczks Exploration Co. v. Oklahoma Water Resources Board, 21 TULSA L.J. 91
(1985).
6. NATIONAL WATER COMM'N, A SUMMARY-DIGEST OF STATE WATER LAWS 614 (R. Dewsnup
& D. Jensen eds. 1973) [hereinafter DiGasT.
7. Id.
8. Acton v. Blundell, 12 M. & W. 324, 152 Eng. Rep. 1223 (Ex. 1843).
9. 60 OKIA. STAT. § 69 (1981).
10. 179 Okla. 53, 64 P.2d 694 (1937). The court appeared to use the terms "reasonable use"
and "correlative rights" interchangeably; however, the better authority is that the reasonable use
rule was adopted in the decision. See Rarick, Oklahoma Water Law, Ground or Percolating in
the Pre-1971 Period, supra note 7.
11. Aiken, Western Water Law in Transition, in WESTERN GROUND WATER LAW: OVERVIEW
AND RECENT DEVELOPMENTS 4 (1985).
12. Id. at 5. In Canada v. City of Shawnee, 179 Okla. 53, 64 P.2d 694, 695 (1937), the court
stated that a landowner has the right to use as much groundwater as he needs if the use bears
some reasonable relationship to the natural use of his land even though the use is industrial and
not agricultural.
13. Act of June 6, 1949, ch. 11, §§ 1-19, 1949 Okla. Sess. Laws 641 (codified as amended at
82 OiLA. STAr. §§ 1001-19 (1971) (repealed 1972).
14. 82 OKRA. STAT. § 1013 (1971) (repealed 1972).
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owner," whose right to use the water was expressly limited to beneficial
use,", or use not in excess of the annual natural recharge rate.'
7
The 1972 Act, the present law,' 8 completely replaced the 1949 Act. Under
the new Act, legislative policy shifted the focus from conservation to utiliza-
tion. Essentially, the 1972 Act ordered that groundwater basins be identified;
that the maximum yield from each water basin be determined by hydrological
studies; and that the amount of water in the basin be divided among owners
of land above the basin in proportion to the surface area owned.' 9 The Act
provided for a maximum annual yield from each basin based on the rate of
taking that will exhaust the basin in twenty years from the date of the Act.2"
The purpose of the 1972 groundwater law was expressed in the Act:
It is hereby declared to be the public policy of this state, in the in-
terest of the agricultural stability, domestic, municipal, industrial
and other beneficial uses, general economy, health and welfare of
the state and its citizens, to utilize groundwater resources of the
state, and for that purpose to provide reasonable regulations for
the allocation for reasonable use based on hydrologic surveys of
fresh groundwater basins or subbasins to determine a restriction
on the production, based upon the acres overlying the ground-
water basin or subbasin.2'
Under the Act, the key to controlling water use is the permit system. Any
person intending to use groundwater must apply to the OWRB for an ap-
propriate permit. 22 After filing the application an applicant must publish a
notice in a newspaper located in the county of the proposed well and in any
additional adjacent counties the OWRB deems appropriate. The publication
should contain essential facts about the well, including the places of taking
and use, amounts to be taken, purpose for which the water is to be used, the
applicant's name, and the time and place of the hearing by the OWRB. The
prospective user must also give notice by certified mail to immediately adja-
cent landowners.
23
15. Id.
16. Id. § 1002.
17. Id. § 1013. Natural recharge rate is defined as "all flow of water into a ground water
basin or subbasin by natural processes including percolation from irrigation." OKLAHOMA
WATER RESOURCES BOARD, RULES, REGULATIONS AND MODS OF PROCEDURE 8 (1982)
[hereinafter OWRB RULES]. The Act was amended in 1961, 1965, and 1967. See Rarick,
Oklahoma Water Law, Ground or Percolating in the Pre-1971 Period, supra note 7, at 421-24.
18. An Act Relating to Ground Water, ch. 248, 1972 Okla. Sess. Laws 529 (codified as
amended in 82 OKLA. STAT. §§ 1020.1-20.22 (1981)).
19. See Jensen, supra note 7, at 459-60.
20. 82 OKLA. STAT. § 1020.5 (1981).
21. Id. § 1020.2. The section further provides that the Act does not apply to taking, using, or
disposing of saltwater connected with exploration, production, or recovery of oil and gas or tak-
ing, using, or disposing of water trapped in producing mines.
22. Id. § 1020.7.
23. Id. § 1020.8.
19871
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The Act gives any interested party the right to protest the application and
present evidence in support of his protest.2 ' If the OWRB approves the ap-
plication, it issues a permit allocating to the applicant a proportionate part of
the maximum annual yield of the basin, equal to the applicant's percentage
of the land overlying the basin.2"
The Act provides for three types of permits. A regular permit authorizes
water use for beneficial uses other than domestic use, which is exempt,2 6 and
is granted only after a hydrologic survey determines the maximum yield of
the basin from which water is to be used.2 7 A temporary permit authorizes
use for the same purposes as a regular permit but is granted before comple-
tion of the survey. It generally allocates two acre-feet of water for each acre
of land owned or leased by the applicant. 28 If the applicant can present clear
and convincing evidence that use of more than two acre-feet will not exhaust
the groundwater supply in less than twenty years, the OWRB may allocate
more water. If a majority of the surface owners request, the permit may
allow less than the standard two acre-feet. A temporary permit must be
revalidated every year, and protests can be heard before renewal9.2
A special permit authorizes a beneficial use that requires quantities in ex-
cess of those permitted under regular or temporary permits. This permit can
be issued instead of or in addition to a regular or a temporary permit,3 0 but
water use is limited to the purpose designated in the permit. Special permits
cannot exceed six months. They can be renewed three times, but successive
special permits cannot be granted for the same purpose.2
The procedure for obtaining all permits is the same. However, a provi-
sional temporary permit effective for sixty days or less can be immediately
granted by the OWRB.32 All permits may be revoked if required water use
reports are not filed,3 3 or if waste occurs.
34
Two sections of the Act determine who can apply for a permit. Section
1020.9 requires the OWRB to find that the lands owned or leased by the ap-
plicant overlie the fresh groundwater basin; that the water will be put to
beneficial use; and that waste will not occur. 31 Section 1020.11 adds a fourth
requirement: ownership. 6 As originally passed, the statute stated:
24. Id.
25. Id. § 102.9.
26. See 82 OKcLA. STAT. § 1020.3 (1981).
27. Id. § 1020.11(A).
28. An acre-foot of water is the amount of water that will cover one acre one foot in depth,
i.e., 325,850 gallons. BLACK's LAW DICrIONARY 23 (5th ed. 1979).
29. 82 OKLA. STAT. § 1020.11(B) (1981).
30. Id. § 1020.11(C).
31. Id.
32. Id. § 1020.10.
33. Id. § 1020.12.
34. Id. § 1020.15.
35. Id. § 1020.9
36. Id. § 1020.11(D).
[Vol. 40
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Except as provided in Section 1020.21 of this title, no permits
shall be issued to an applicant who does not own the land on
which the well is to be located, or hold a valid lease from the
owner of such land permitting withdrawal of water from such
basin or subbasin.3
It is worthwhile at this point to note that the analogous rule in the OWRB
regulations differs slightly but significantly from the above pre-Ricks
statutory version. It reads:
[N]o permit shall be issued to an applicant who is not the surface
owner of the land on which the well is to be located, or hold a
valid right from such surface owner permitting withdrawal of
water. A copy of the written permission shall be attached to the
application.
38
It is the difference in this language that generated the Ricks case and the
subsequent change conforming the statute to the language of the OWRB
regulation.
The Ricks Case and Subsequent Statutory Changes
Ricks Exploration Company held a mineral lease in Grady County from an
owner of a severed mineral estate. Without first obtaining a permit, Ricks
went upon the land and drilled a fresh-water well to use in its drilling opera-
tions. The surface owners successfully obtained a temporary restraining order
prohibiting use of the groundwater. Ricks then twice applied for ground-
water use permits . The Oklahoma Water Resources Board refused to grant
the permits because Ricks did not own the surface estate; it did not have a
valid lease from the owner of the land (which the Board interpreted as mean-
ing "surface owner'"4 0 ); and it did not have the landowner's written consent
to withdraw the groundwater. 4' The district court of Oklahoma County af-
firmed OWRB's decision. 2 Ricks appealed to the Oklahoma Supreme
Court.
41
The court overruled the trial court. In his opinion, Justice Opala con-
sidered three points to determine whether Ricks had standing to apply for a
permit: (1) whether a mineral lessee has a common law right to the use of
37. Id. § 1020.11(D). Section 1020.21 provides that municipalities can regulate or permit
drilling within their corporate limits.
38. OWRB RuLEs, supra note 20, at 58. See infra text accompanying note 68 for the
legislative version.
39. The Ricks decision consolidated two appeals: Ricks Explor. Co. v. Oklahoma Water
Res. Bd., No. CJ-82-535 (7th Dist. Okla. County 1982); Ricks Explor. Co. v. Oklahoma Water
Res. Bd., No. CJ-82-3551 (7th Dist. Okla. County 1982).
40. Ricks, 695 P.2d at 501. See also supra note 38 and accompanying text.
41. Ricks, 695 P.2d at 501.
42. Id. at 500.
43. Id. at 501.
1987]
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groundwater; (2) if so, to what extent that right may have been affected by
the groundwater statute; and (3) whether Ricks met the "ownership" require-
ment of section 1020.11(D)."
The court noted that since 1940, case law has held that the mineral estate is
dominant,4" and its owner has the implicit right to enter upon and make
reasonable use of the surface in exploring for and extracting the mineral
deposits. 46 While recognizing that the surface owner clearly owns the
underlying fresh groundwater4 7 the opinion added that the interest is limited
by the mine.ral owner's right to use reasonable amounts in the enjoyment of
his estate."1 Furthermore, the rights created by an oil and gas lease include
the common law interests.
4
9
After a review of the apparent purposes of the Act," the court addressed
the ownersldp requirements of section 1020.11(D).5 ' The ruling rejected
OWRB's interpretation of ownership, concluding that it altered private com-
mon law rights of a mineral owner, then added:
A mineral owner's claim to groundwater use is a "vested right"
created by common law. Once created, it becomes absolute, and is
protected from legislative invasion by Art. 5 §§ 52 and 54, Okl.
Const. A vested interest will not be deemed abrogated or impaired
except by explicit legislative extinguishment effective prospec-
tively. 5
The court perceived no manifest legislative intent to alter a mineral
owner's private interest in groundwater use. The court reasoned that if the
legislature intended to alter the mineral owner's claim to groundwater, the
statute would expressly subject the right to the sole discretion of the surface
owner or establish a method of compensating the surface owner for the use
of the water.5 3 Citing the 1982 Surface Damages Act,54 the court noted that
when the legislature sought to affect the mineral owner's common law right
of free access and reasonable use of the surface for oil and gas purposes, it
explicitly manifested that intention in the Act.15
44. Id. at 503.
45. Id. (citing Hinds v. Phillips Pet. Co., 591 P.2d 697 (Okla. 1979); Wilcox Oil Co. v.
Lawson, 341 P.2d 591 (Okla. 1959); Melton v. Sneed, 188 Okla. 388, 109 P.2d 509 (1940); 1 E.
KuNTz, OIL AND, G.s § 3.2 (1962)).
46. Ricks, 695 P.2d at 503 (citing Wilcox Oil, 341 P.2d 591 Okla. 1959); Cities Serv. Oil Co.
v. Dacus, 325 P.2d 1035 (Okla. 1958); Melton v. Sneed, 188 Okla. 388, 109 P.2d 509 (1940);
Sanders v. Davis, 79 Okla. 253, 192 P. 694 (1920); 1 E. KuNTZ, supra note 45).
47. Ricks, 695 P.2d at 503 (citing 60 Okla. Stat. § 60 (1981)).
48. Id. at 503.
49. Id. (citing Rinds, 591 P.2d at 698-99).
50. Id. See also supra note 21 and accompanying text.
51. Ricks, 695 P.2d at 503-04. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
52. Ricks, 695 P.2d. at 504 (citations omitted).
53. Id.
54. 52 OKLA. STAT. §§ 318.1-318.9 (Supp. 1982).
55. Ricks, 695 P.2d at 504 n.27.
[Vol. 40
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol40/iss1/9
NOTES
The court further stated that once vested rights were acquired under exist-
ing laws, those rights could not be taken away without due process of law or
just compensation. 6 The court cited Wolfenbarger v. Hennessee,-" which
held that the act of an administrative body constituted state action within the
due process clause. It reasoned that to accept OWRB's interpretation of sec-
tion 1020.11(D) would be to strip mineral owners of standing to apply for a
permit. That would allow surface owners to invoke state power to destroy
private rights, a violation of the Oklahoma constitution, article 2, sections 23
and 24.18
The supreme court's decision did not represent the final word. Ricks was
decided on October 16, 1984.59 By the time a rehearing was denied on
February 26, 1985,60 a proposal to change the language had been introduced
in the legislature.
It is most interesting to note that the proposed changes introduced on
February 21, 1985,61 did not involve section 1020.11(D), dealing with stand-
ing to apply for a permit.62 Subsection D was modified in senate committee. 63
As reported from the senate committee,"4 adopted by the senate, 6 the
house, 6 6 and approved by the governor, 67 it now provides:
D. Except as provided in Section 1020.21 of this title, no permits
shall be issued to an applicant who is not the surface owner of the
land on which the well is to be located, or does not hold a valid
lease from such owner permitting withdrawal of water from such
basin or subbasin. 68
This language is virtually the same as that in the OWRB rules and regula-
tions.6 9
56. Id. at 505; OKLA. CONST. art. II, § 7.
57. 520 P.2d 809 (Okla. 1974). See also Ricks, 695 P.2d at 505 (citing Shelley v. Kraemer,
334 U.S. 1 (1948)).
58. Ricks, 695 P.2d at 505.
59. Id. at 498.
60. Id.
61. JouRNL oF Tm SENATE: FmsT REGTuAR SESSION OF Tm FooTnmr LEGISLATURE oF
OxLA O A 206 (1985) [hereinafter SENATE JouRNAL].
62. S. 266, 40th Legis., Ist Sess., 1985 Okla. Sess. Laws 307-08.
63. SENATE JoURNAL, supra note 61, at 268.
64. Report of Natural Resources Comm., S. 266, 40th Legis., Ist Sess., 1985 Okla. Sess.
Laws 307-98.
65. SENATE JouRNAL, supra note 61, at 330-31.
66. JoURNAL oF Tm HousE OF REPREsENTATrvES oF Ta FORTITH LEoISLATuRE OF om STATE
op OLA O1,A-FmsT REGULA.R SEmssIoN-1985 at 913-14.
67. 1985 Okla. Sess. Law, supra note 62, at 307-08.
68. 82 OKLA. STAT. § 1020.11(D) (Supp. 1986).
69. See supra note 38 and accompanying text. In the Oklahoma Legislative Reporter, the
following article was published under the headline "Water Permit Bill Fails":
SB 266 by Sen. Ray Giles, D-Pocaset, would allow the water board to simply
revalidate the temporary permits it issues. That was the board's practice in the
19871
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Effect of the Statutory Change
There is no change for the surface owner, who by statute owns the ground-
water and explicitly has standing.7" Presumably, the agricultural lessee,
holding a valid lease from the surface owner, also remains unaffected by the
change. Such a lessee does not need a permit for domestic use. 7' He would
rarely seek a permit for irrigation; the cost of an irrigation system is impos-
sible to justify under all but exceptionally long leases. Municipalities are
unaffected, as the statute gives them authority to regulate or permit domestic
and industrial water wells within their corporate limits.7 2 Any lease concern-
ing wells outside the corporate limits ordinarily has a clause granting the
lessee the right to drill and take water, thus meeting the requirement of hav-
ing written permission from the surface owner.
Similarly, there will be no difficulty for a mineral lessee who obtains his
lease from the owner of an unsevered surface and mineral estate. The stan-
dard lease form invariably contains provisions similar to the following:
"Lessee shall have the right to use, free of cost, gas, oil and water produced
on said land for its operations thereon, except water from wells of lessor. '",
There should be no dispute that a lessee of a mineral estate severed after
this Act took effect would have no standing to apply for a permit.7" No
rights could become vested after the Act took effect. As a result, those ob-
taining mineral estates in the future would be well advised to have in their
deed a water use clause similar to that in a standard oil and gas lease.
The persons most affected are owners and lessees of the vast number of
mineral estates severed before the 1985 statutory change, who either have not
drilled and have no need for the water or have a different need than before,
for example, secondary recovery operations. Did those persons have an inter-
est in the water before the Act took effect, and if so, did they lose it upon
enactment of the 1985 legislation?
past, but a State Supreme Court ruling last December said that was not how it
should be done.
Giles said the law had never intended for permit holders to appear before the
board for a hearing each time a permit was renewed. He said SB 266 would simply
put into law what had been in practice for years.
Sen. Norman Lamb, R-Enid, said the measure could seriously impact rural
water districts, especially in western Oklahoma. He added the problem lies not
with the curt's decision, but with the board's practices.
The bill failed by a 27-20 vote, but Giles held it on the calendar to reconsider the
vote.
OKLA. LEGis. Rprm, Mar. 15, 1985 (weekly rev. ed.), at 2.
70. 60 OKLA. STAT. § 60 (1981).
71. 82 OKLA. STAT. § 1020.3 (Supp. 1986).
72. Id. § 1020.21. See also supra note 37.
73. Form 88 (Prod. Pooling) (Oklahoma) (840 Shut in) (rev. 1963) SD-BL Royalty,
Burkhart's Legal Forms, Tulsa.
74. 82 OrLA. STAT. § 1020.11 (Supp. 1986) shows the Act took effect on May 28, 1985, as a
result of the emergency provision.
[Vol. 40
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Constitutionality of the Revised Act
The Oklahoma court has ruled that a mineral interest is not possessory in
nature,7 but rather a profit a prendre," or an incorporeal hereditament.17 At
other times it has been described as ag easement. 7 8 Regardless of termin-
ology, Ricks strongly indicates that an owner of a mineral interest gets more
than simply the minerals.
Whether a property interest is created by reservation 79 or grant,"° Melton
v. Sneed ruled that unless expressly stated to the contrary, "a grant of such
incidental rights as are essential to the full enjoyment of the property con-
veyed will be implied."" Oklahoma courts apply this same rule to an oil and
gas lease from the surface owner.'2 In particular, courts have held that such
rights include the right to drill a water well.' 3 The Oklahoma court has
adopted the philosophy that the reservation of minerals in the grant of a sur-
face estate retained in the grantor the right to use reasonable amounts of
groundwater to develop the mineral estate.'
4
An easement thus burdens the surface estate, unless specifically excluded in
the conveying instrument. 5 In other words, the mineral estate is dominant.
86
But the extent of the mineral owner's right is limited to what is reasonably
necessary for the use and enjoyment of the estate, including the use of
reasonable amounts of groundwater. 7 The nature of these rights and how
they vest is the subject of the following discussion.
Constitutional Prohibitions Against Interference with
Interests of Mineral Owners
There is little question that it is within the legislature's power to deprive
75. See Rich v. Doneghey, 71 Okla. 204, 177 P. 86 (1918). See also Wright v. Carter Oil Co.,
97 Okla. 46, 223 P. 835 (1923).
76. "Profit a prendre" is defined as "A right to take a part of the soil or produce of the
land. A right to take from the soil, such as by logging, mining, drilling, etc. The taking (profit)
is the distinguishing characteristic from an easement." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1090 (5th ed.
1979).
77. "Incorporeal hereditament" is defined as "Anything, the subject of property, which is
inheritable and not tangible or visible.... A right growing out of, or concerning, or annexed
to, a corporeal thing, but not the substance of the thing itself." BLACK's LAW DIctnONARY 653
(5th ed. 1979).
78. Hinds v. Phillips Pet. Co., 591 P.2d 697 (Okla. 1979).
79. Newbern v. Gould, 162 Okla. 82, 19 P.2d 157 (1933). Overruled, Douglas v. Douglas,
176 Okla. 378, 56 P.2d 362 (1936); Ramey v. Stephney, 70 Okla. 87, 173 P. 72 (1918).
80. Nilsen v. Tenneco Oil Co., 614 P.2d 36 (Okla. 1980); Douglas v. Douglas, 176 Okla.
378, 56 P.2d 362 (1936).
81. 188 Okla. 388, 109 P.2d 509, 512 (1940).
82. Pulaski Oil Co. v. Conner, 62 Okla. 211, 162 P. 464 (1916).
83. Davis v. Little, 289 P.2d 666 (Okla. 1955) (moot question); Stradley v. Magnolia Pet.
Co., 155 S.W.2d 649 (Tex. Civ. App. 1941). See also E. KUNTZ, supra note 45, § 50.2(b).
84. Mack Oil Co. v. Laurence, 389 P.2d 955 (Okla. 1964).
85. See Hinds v. Phillips Pet. Co., 591 P.2d 697 (Okla. 1979).
86. Cities Serv. Co. v. Dacus, 325 P.2d 1035 (Okla. 1958); Wilcox Oil Co. v. Lawson, 301
P.2d 686 (Okla. 1956).
87. See supra notes 45-58 and accompanying text (discussion of Ricks).
1987]
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one of an interest before it comes into existence." Constitutional questions
arise, however, when the legislature attempts to divest existing rights.
The Rickyf court expressly assumed that a mineral owner's claim to ground-
water use was a "vested right," 8 9 citing Oklahoma Water Resources Board v.
Central Oklahoma Master Conservancy District" and Crump v. Guyer.9
These cases support the court's conclusion by analogy; neither case decided
the question of whether a claim to groundwater was a vested right."
However, the principle underlying both Crump and Central Oklahoma
Master Conservancy District is the same: the right being claimed by a partic-
ular party is determined by the law in effect at the time the right vests, before
any legislative amendments are made.9
3
The principle of respecting vested rights is strong and deep. Protection of
such rights i the Oklahoma constitution is inherent in article 2, sections 7,94 24,9s
88. Roxana Pet. Co. v. Cope, 132 Okla. 152, 269 P. 1084 (1928).
89. Ricks, 695 P.2d at 504.
90. 464 P.2d 748 (Okla. 1969).
91. 60 Okla. 222, 157 P. 321 (1916).
In Crump, the court defined and characterized "vested right" as the power to per-
form certamn actions or to possess certain things lawfully, and is substantially a
property ri,,ht; and when it has been once conferred or becomes absolute by con-
tract or existing laws, it is protected from invasion by the Legislature, by those
provisions in the Constitution which apply to such rights.
Id., 157 P. at 323.
92. Central Oklahoma Master Conservancy District dealt with surface water, not ground-
water; Crump dealt with a minor's right to convey real estate after marriage.
93. The court, in One Chicago Coin's Play Boy Marble Board, No. 19771 v. State ex rel.
Adams, 202 Okla. 246, 212 P.2d 129, 133 (1949), said it makes no difference whether the change
is by amending a statute or repealing it and replacing it with a new one. "Although an amend-
ment is not the same as repeal, to a certain degree it operates as a repeal." See Walker v. Nix,
196 Okla. 365, 165 P.2d 378 (1946); Baker v. Tulsa Bldg. & Loan Ass'n, 179 Okla. 432, 66 P.2d
45 (1937).
94. "No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process of law."
OKLA. CONsr. art. II, § 7.
95. OKLA. CO mT. art. II, § 24 provides:
Private property shall not be taken or damaged for public use without just com-
pensation. Such compensation, irrespective of any benefit from any improvements
proposed, shall be ascertained by a board of commissioners of not less than three
freeholders, in such manner as may be prescribed by law. The commissioners shall
not be appointed by any judge or court without reasonable notice having been
served upon all parties in interest. The commissioners shall be selected from the
regular jury list of names prepared and made as the Legislature shall provide. Any
party aggrieved shall have the right of appeal, without bond, and trial by jury in a
court of record. Until the compensation shall be paid to the owner, or into the
court for the owner, the property shall not be disturbed or the proprietary rights of
the owner divested. When possession is taken of property condemned for any
public use, the owner shall be entitled to the immediate receipt of the compensa-
tion awarded, without prejudice to the right of either party to prosecute further
proceedings for the judicial determination of the sufficiency or insufficiency of
such compensation. The fee of land taken by common carriers for right of way,
without the consent of the owner, shall remain in such owner subject only to the
use for which it is taken. In all cases of condemnation of private property for
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and 23,96 as well as article 5, sections 5291 and 54.95 As the Crump court noted:
[W]here rights of property are admitted to exist, the Legislature
cannot say they shall exist no longer; that if it were otherwise, the
Constitution would then mean that no person shall be deprived of
his property or rights unless the Legislature shall pass a law to ef-
fectuate the wrong; and this would be throwing the restraint en-
tirely away.99
The mineral owner obtains as part of his easement, or profit,I" the right to
reasonable use of the surface owner's estate in the enjoyment of his
interests.'' A mineral lease includes a grant of these interests. 02 In many in-
stances, this right to groundwater may not have been exercised before the
amendment to the statute was adopted. Arguably, however, this should have
no effect because it has been held that failure to exercise a vested right before
the passage of a subsequent statute seeking to divest it does not affect or
lessen the right. 0 3 Perhaps as applicable here, the court in Cowart v. Piper
Aircraft Corp.'0 held that article 5, section 54 of the state constitution pro-
hibited the repeal of an accrued right to bring an action-here, an applica-
tion for a water permit. 05
Police Power: Constitutional Justification for Interference with
Interests of Mineral Owners
Nothing is absolute. The route through which the state terminates or limits
public or private use, the determination of the character of the use shall be a
judicial question.
96. Article 2, section 23 provides:
No private property shall be taken or damaged for private use, with or without
compensation, unless by consent of the owner, except for private ways of neces-
sity, or for drains and ditches across lands of others for agricultural, mining or
sanitary purposes, in such manner as may be prescribed by law.
OKLA. CONST. art. II, § 23.
97. Article 5, section 52 provides:
The Legislature shall have no power to revive any right or remedy which may have
become barred by lapse of time, or by any statute of this State. After suit has been
commenced on any cause of action, the Legislature shall have no power to take
away such cause of action, or destroy any existing defense to such suit.
OKLA. CONST. art. V, § 52.
98. "The repeal of a statute shall not revive a statute previously repealed by such statute, nor
shall such repeal affect any accrued right, or penalty incurred, or proceedings begun by virtue of
such repealed statute." OKLA. CONST. art. V, § 54.
99. Crump, 157 P. at 323.
100. See supra notes 77-78 and accompanying text.
101. See cases cited supra note 45.
102. Hinds, 591 P.2d 697.
103. Barnett v. Sanders, 121 Okla. 14, 247 P. 55 (1926); Crump, 157 P. at 323.
104. 665 P.2d 315 (Okla. 1983).
105. Id. at 317-18. The court noted, however, that the subject of the inquiry was a right of ac-
tion, not simply procedural provision. Id. at 318 n.4.
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private rights lies in its police power." 6 There are no cases in Oklahoma deal-
ing with use of police powers to enforce groundwater distribution. On the
other hand, almost every exercise of authority to regulate oil and gas interests
has experienced a constitutional challenge. Some of those cases will necessari-
ly be examined. Those, combined with constitutional challenges to water
statutes in other states, may suggest the outcome of a challenge to the
Oklahoma water statute.
Historically, eastern states have seldom needed to enact water law legisla-
tion because of the general abundance of water." 7 Virtually every western
state has somz kind of legislation restraining water use, 0 8 but not all those
states have had litigation challenging the validity of their statutes. And while
no state's policy is exactly like Oklahoma's, the underlying principles govern-
ing the right of the state to regulate water are the same. As the following
discussion will show, the vast majority of courts have upheld water statutes
as valid exercises of police powers." 9
An important case deciding the validity of the Kansas water statute is
Williams v. City of Wichita." ° In Williams, the city appealed an adverse
judgment that declared the state act unconstitutional on both state", and
federal" 2 constitutional grounds and enjoined the city from obtaining
groundwater outside its city limits."13 The act declared that all water in the
state was dedicated to public use and subject to state control. This control,
however, was limited by the vested rights of any person, except in the case of
nonuse. 1" 4 The court seized upon the "nonuse" language that was present in
four of the seven general purposes of the act,'"1 declaring that "vested
right," as used in the act, presumed the beneficial use of water." 6 Stressing
106. Police power is defined as:
The power of the State to place restraints on the personal freedom and property
rights of persons for the protection of the public safety, health, and morals or the
promotion of the public conveyance and general prosperity. The police power is
subject to limitations of the federal and state constitutions, and especially to the
requirement of due process.
BLACK'S LAW DIcIrONARY 1041 (5th ed. 1979).
107. DIGEST, supra note 6, at 16.
108. Id. at 1.4.
109. The discussion is primarily restricted to state supreme courts due to the nature of the
statutes and the issues involved. The United States Supreme Court has held that the construction
of state statutory provisions is left to the states in the first instance if the state has the authority
to enact such lais. Williams v. Oklahoma, 358 U.S. 576 (1959), reh'g denied, 359 U.S. 956
(1959).
110. 190 Kan. 317, 374 P.2d 578 (1962).
111. KAN. CoNsT., Bill of Rights, §§ 1, 18, and 20 (dealing respectively with equality of
citizens, justice without delay, and powers retained by the people) and KAN. CONsr. art. II, § 16
(dealing with completeness of title on the bill). See also infra note 172.
112. U.S. CONE.T. amend. XIV, § I (due process clause).
113. 190 Kan. 317, 374 P.2d at 580.
114. Id., 374 P.2d at 591.
115. Id.
116. Id., 374 F.2d at 591.
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that any modification of the law must respect existing vested rights, the court
refused to recognize a vested right in underground waters that the landowner
had not appropriated and applied to beneficial uses. 1"' The owner's right, the
court said, lay in the right to use the water as it passes through the owner's
soil,"" and the act recognized a superior vested right of water users to con-
tinue use in the same amounts. Therefore, the act applied only to water not
being beneficially used at the time the act took effect." 9 By taking a view
finding no interference with a vested right, the court was able to avoid a con-
stitutional invalidity.
The court further stated that the law was a proper exercise of police power.
Citing Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty, 20 the court noted that legislation
limiting a right of use is in itself no more objectionable than legislation for-
bidding the use of property for certain purposes.' 2 ' Requiring a user to make
application and furnish information for a permit to use the water on his own
land did not deny due process; the act did not confiscate rights by legislative
fiat. "Rather, it is a proper and reasonable exercise of the police power of
the state in controlling water use for the purpose of preventing waste and to
conserve a valuable natural resource.'
22
The Kansas act withstood a constitutional challenge in the federal courts in
Baumann v. Smrha.2 3 In that case, a three-judge panel was asked to deter-
mine whether the water act violated the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment to the United States Constitution. The court upheld the act, say-
ing it was valid as long as it protected the rights of landowners who had ac-
quired those rights by prior use by the time the statute went into effect.' 24
The change in the Oklahoma statute does not parallel the Kansas statute.
The Kansas act specifically makes reference to and protects amounts of water
previously used, defining those as "vested rights.' 2 The wording in the
Oklahoma change makes no reference to prior use and appears to deny
mineral owners, who formerly had some sort of property interest, any right
to apply for a permit at all.
In the Arizona case of Southwest Engineering Co. v. Ernst,'26 the chal-
lenged act provided a method for determining "critical groundwater areas"
within a state that did not have sufficient groundwater to maintain irrigation
use at current levels. Within these areas, wells other than domestic and
117. Id., 374 P.2d at 593.
118. Id., 374 P.2d at 584.
119. Id., 374 P.2d at 591.
120. 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
121. Williams, 374 P.2d at 595.
122. Id., 374 P.2d at 595. Preventing waste is a common reason given for upholding water
statutes in most challenges to water laws. That may not be as compelling a reason with regard to
mineral owners in Oklahoma, however. See infra notes 203-206 and accompanying text.
123. 145 F. Supp. 617 (D. Kan. 1956), aff'd, 352 U.S. 863 (1956).
124. 145 F. Supp. at 625.
125. Williams, 190 Kan. 317, 374 P.2d at 595.
126. 79 Ariz. 403, 291 P.2d 764 (1955).
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replacement wells were prohibited. However, the act did allow wells pumping
at the time to continue operating at their full capacity.' 2  The plaintiff
claimed that it owned the water underlying its land and that the due process
clause of the state and federal constitutions protected the water from con-
fiscation.121
The court upheld the statute. It noted that the act had a valid purpose, to
conserve and protect the water resources of the state in the interest of
agricultural stability, general economy, and welfare of the state.2 9 In the
court's view, the case presented an "unavoidable choice" between one class
of property and another. 3 ' Having earlier noted the arid climatic conditions
of much oF the state, the court stated:
We are of the opinion that there is a preponderant public concern
in the preservation of the lands presently reclaimable, and that
where as here the choice is unavoidable because a supply of water
is not available for both, we cannot say that the exercise of such
choice, controlled by considerations of social policy which are not
unreasonable, involves a denial of due process.' 3'
The Oklahoma Act is different. There is no provision, as 'there is in the
Arizona statute, for prohibiting use in some areas of the state, for example,
the northwest and panhandle regions of Oklahoma where water is scarce and
limiting use would be justifiable. Additionally, the nature of the mineral
estate differs from the surface estate. It may be considered prudent to allow a
mineral estate to lie dormant for a substantial period of time, perhaps until
prices are more favorable. It is not practical to do so with irrigated farmland,
the interest covered by the Arizona statute.
North Dakota has upheld an act that changed ownership of groundwater
from the landowner to the public.' 32 In Baeth v. Hoisveen,'3 the plaintiffs
claimed that the act was unconstitutional because it deprived landowners of
vested rights contrary to the due process clauses of both the state and federal
constitutions. In reasoning similar to the Kansas court in Williams,'3 4 the
court focused on whether a landowner had a vested right in waters underly-
ing his land if' he was making no use of the water before the state appro-
priated it.' 3 1 The court stated that the landowner acquired a vested right,
commonly referred to as a usufructary right, after he withdrew and applied
the groundwater to a beneficial use. The court held that a landowner did not
have a vested right to groundwater underlying his land that he had not been
127. Id., 291 P.2d at 767.
128. Id., 291 P.2d at 768.
129. Id., 291 P.2d at 767.
130. Id., 2,91 P.2d at 768.
131. Id., 291 P.2d at 769
132. DIGEsr, supra note 6, at 579.
133. 157 N.W.2d 728 (N.D. 1968).
134. See supra notes 110-122 and accompanying text.
135. 157 N.W.2d at 731.
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using."3 6 He, therefore, lost nothing because he could not lose something he
never had.
The Baeth court noted that North Dakota was a semiarid state and was,
therefore, justified in limiting its water resources for the general welfare of
the people. The court stated that requiring water resources to be put to their
most beneficial uses was a valid purpose of a water act, as was preventing
waste and unreasonable uses of the water.
137
South Dakota struck down an early water regulation bill in St. Germain Ir-
rigating Co. v. Hawthorne Ditch Co.' 38 The challenged act declared that all
waters were public property and subject to appropriation for beneficial use.
The owner could not utilize water without purchasing a permit., 39 With very
little discussion and no mention of whether prior water use was a factor, the
court held that the act, by requiring the purchase of a permit, destroyed
vested property rights in violation of the state constitution's due process
clause. ,o
The South Dakota court later used police power and a provision protecting
vested rights to uphold a similar statute in Knight v. Grimes."' The court
noted that there had been an invasion of the preexisting interest of absolute
ownership. However, it refused to equate the right to take and use water with
actual ownership.' 2 The court, quoting Southwest Engineering Co. v.
Ernst, 13 stated that the preference of public interest over individual property
interests is a proper exercise of police power, even if the police power
destroys that individual right."'
In summary, the courts were willing to uphold laws restricting water use if
prior rights were protected and if the" restriction was for the good of the
general public. But there is an important difference between the circum-
stances of those cases and the circumstances that would arise under the
Oklahoma statutory change. As the following discussion indicates,
Oklahoma has used police power to restrict petroleum production for the
public good, but has refused to uphold its use when it has only benefited
another private entity.
Exercise of Police Power in Oklahoma
As petroleum recovery became important in Oklahoma, the state recog-
nized that a substantial amount of oil could be lost forever by irresponsible
drilling. Consequently, regulations were enacted to protect both the rights of
the mineral owner and the lessee. Predictably, the regulations were chal-
136. Id. at 732.
137. Id. at 733
138. 32 S.D. 260, 143 N.W. 124 (1913).
139. Id., 143 N.W. at 126.
140. Id.
141. 80 S.D. 517, 127 N.W.2d 708 (1964)..
142. Id., 127 N.W.2d at 711
143. 79 Ariz. 403, 291 P.2d 764 (1955).
144. Knight, 127 N.W.2d at 711.
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lenged as unconstitutional. The challengers claimed that the acts interfered
with their right to take what was rightfully theirs. Since the purpose of this
note is not to examine statutes governing oil and gas, the following discus-
sion will limit its focus to the court's justification of regulatory statutes.
A statute limiting a person's oil production to a proportionate share of the
total potential production of a pool was upheld against both state'4 and
federal ' 6 constitutional challenges in C. C. Julian Oil & Royalties Co. v.
Capshaw.'" The purpose of the statute was to provide a comprehensive plan
for preventing economic waste, underground waste, surface waste, and waste
incidental to production of oil in excess of transportation or market facilities
or reasonable market demand. 48 Regarding police powers, the court stated
that the concept is somewhat elusive and difficult to define, largely because it
is "plastic in its nature and accommodates itself to every change of condi-
tions which call for its application.'
4 9
The court compared the statute with another state's statute that had been
upheld by the United States Supreme Court. In that discussion, the Court
noted that police powers were being used to protect correlative rights of all
mineral owners in the area:
Viewed, then, as a statute to protect or to prevent the waste of the
common property of the surface owners, the law of the state...
which is here attacked because it is asserted that it divested private
property without due compensation, in substance, is a statute pro-
tecting private property and preventing it from being taken by one
of the common owners without regard to the enjoyment of
others3.11
In the court's view, to hold otherwise would result in greater losses. An irre-
sponsible mineral developer who claimed that drilling regulations were taking
away his rights could, without violating the Constitution of the United
States, deprive all other mineral owners of the same rights.'
In Patterson v. Stanolind Oil & Gas Co.,"' the court upheld the constitu-
tionality of a well-spacing statute by reasoning that the regulation was
designed to prevent unnecessary loss, destruction, or waste of the minerals.'3
Without the regulation, the court noted, it would be possible for one pro-
ducer to obtain an undue proportion of the oil to the detriment of others. It
could also result in waste by one or more producers to the annihilation of the
rights of the remainder." 4 The court refrained from likening the regulation
145. OKLA. CONST. art. II, § 7. See supra note 94 for text.
146. U.S. Coiqsr. amend. XIV, § 1.
147. 145 Okla. 237, 292 P. 841 (1930).
148. Id., 292 P. at 842.
149. Id., 292 P. at 843.
150. Id., 292 P. at 844-45 (citing Ohio Oil Co. v. Indiana, 177 U.S. 190, 210-11 (1900)).
151. Id., 292 P. at 844-45.
152. 182 Oklt. 155, 77 P.2d 83 (1938).
153. Id., 77 P.2d at 88.
154. Id., 77 P.2d at 88.
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to one that took or confiscated property rights. Rather, the ruling
characterized it as a regulation that merely restricted or qualified the prop-
erty's use. This, the court held, did not violate the due process clause of the
Constitution.'I
The court in Anderson-Pritchard Oil Corp. v. Corporation Commission
recognized that an estate of sorts may be vested in a mineral lessee.' 6
However, an estate vested by production does not create rights that transcend
a regulating agency's power to take steps protecting correlative rights of all
who take from a common source of supply.'" Regulations, the ruling said,
are not unconstitutional merely because they limit private personal or prop-
erty rights; they are a proper function of police power.'
58
However, a police power justification was rejected in Oklahoma Natural
Gas Co. v. Choctaw Gas Co.15 The court ruled that an order requiring one
natural gas producer to connect its pipeline with another company and sell
that company enough gas to meet its needs is not a valid exercise of police
power.' In his opinion, Justice Corn noted that the state has a proper inter-
est in using its police power to preserve exhaustible natural resources. But
when private rights are subordinated to regulatory authority, the extent to
which those rights are impaired, as well as the public benefit to be derived
from the impairment, must be considered in defining a proper exercise of
police power.' 6' "Mere pronouncement that a thing is done in the public in-
terest of conservation is insufficient to establish its validity as a conservation
measure." 62
This case more closely parallels Ricks than any other discussed. Basically,
the court viewed the Choctaw case as a question of adjusting rights between
two private parties. While this is obviously a proper function of the courts, it
is an improper function of police power. By its ruling, the court plainly indi-
cated that use of police power would not be honored.
Vested Rights, Police Power, and the Revised Act
The cases that upheld water statutes generally have one thing in common:
the courts interpreted the statutes to protect those who had established vested
rights, often doing so by use. That is, the statutes contained wording indicat-
ing they would apply only prospectively, or the courts found no genuine
claim to a vested right. The South Dakota statute that was declared uncon-
stitutional also recognized a vested right of water users, but only if those
155. Id., 77 P.2d at 89.
156. 205 Okla. 672, 241 P.2d 363 (1951).
157. Id., 241 P.2d at 367.
158. Id., 241 P.2d at 372 (citing Lombardo v. City of Dallas, 124 Tex. 1, 73 S.W.2d 475
(1934)).
159. 205 Okla. 255, 236 P.2d 970 (1951).
160. Id., 236 P.2d at 977.
161. Id., 236 P.2d at 975 (citing Grison Oil Corp. v. Corporation Comm'n, 186 Okla. 548, 99
P.2d 134 (1940)).
162. 205 Okla. 255, 236 P.2d at 975.
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users paid a fee for the privilege of using their water. The basic theme of the
oil and gas cases was that by limiting one party's drilling operations, the state
was protecting its natural resources as well as the correlative rights of others
entitled to share those resources.
Thus, the state has the power to limit or deny an owner's right to use what
is his if the limitation or denial is in the public interest and for the general
welfare of the people. The question then becomes: Does this statute denying
a water use permit serve those ends? As with most questions challenging the
validity of a statute on constitutional grounds, predicting an outcome is
speculative.
Initially, it should be noted that the court is loath to strike down any act of
legislation. The court has stated that it will presume a legislative intention to
conform to the provisions of the Constitution.'6 3 Similarly, the court will not
pronounce legislation unconstitutional in a doubtful case but will resolve
every reasonable doubt in favor of its validity. 164 In other words, "merely to
doubt the constitutionality of a statute is to uphold it.'"" Before deciding
whether the court might uphold a statute, examining the means by which it is
judged would be helpful.
Both federal and state courts have followed the rule set forth in Nebbia v.
New York'66: due process requires only that the law in question "shall not be
unreasonabT.e, arbitrary, or capricious, and that the means selected shall have
a real and substantial relation to the object sought to be attained.""'  This
test, often called the rational basis test, was applied within a short time by
the courts to statutes regulating everything from barber prices"' to natural
resources.""15 The Oklahoma court stated as a rationale for the rational basis
test that the legislature is in a better position to judge the necessity of a
statute's enactment. Therefore, every possible presumption favors its valid-
ity, even if the court questions the wisdom of the bill.'
When the legislature does act, however, its action is always open to judicial
scrutiny to prevent transgression of the limits of its power. A legislature can-
not prevent judicial review by any declaration or legislative finding in the act
itself.' Thus, stating the purpose of the bill in the title will not prevent the
court from examining the act to see if it transcends its stated purposes. "'
163. State ax rel. Hudson v. Carter, 167 Okla. 32, 27 P.2d 617 (1933).
164. Swandav. Swanda, 207 Okla. 186, 248 P.2d 575, 577 (1952).
165. Id., 248 P.2d at 577 (citing In re Lee, 64 Okla. 310, 168 P. 53 (1917)).
166. 291 U.S. 502 (1934).
167. Id. at 525.
168. Herrin v. Arnold, 183 Okla. 392, 82 P.2d 977 (1938).
169. Bay Pet. Corp. v. Corporation Comm'n, 36 F. Supp. 66 (D. Kan. 1940).
170. Herrirg, 82 P.2d at 980.
171. Polk v. Alcoholic Beverage Control Bd., 420 P.2d 520, 522-23 (Okla. 1966).
172. It would be possible, but probably futile, to advance an argument that the water statute
is invalid under OKLA. CoNsr. art. V, § 57, requiring that every act embrace one subject, which
should be clearly expressed in its title. The title of the bill amending the statute makes no men-
tion of the changes made in subsection D, giving only the surface owner the right to apply for a
permit. However, the court has ruled that it is enough that all elements in the measure be related
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The court will also strike down a measure if the act purports to have a
uniform operation throughout a particular class in the state but in reality
favors a special area or class. For that reason, the court declared unconstitu-
tional a measure allowing Tulsa to enact special zoning regulations when
Tulsa was the only city in the state that met the requirements of the statute.
In Elias v. City of Tulsa,17 the court stated that a statute was acceptable if it
had a uniform operation.' 7 ' Similarly, a general law having local application
would also pass constitutional muster if it operated equally on all subjects in
the class for which it was adopted.
1 5
But, the court added, "where a statute operates upon a class, the
classification must not be capricious or arbitrary and must be reasonable and
pertain to some peculiarity in the subject-matter calling for the
legislation.' 176 Concerning the people or places included and those omitted,
the court said there must be "some distinctive characteristic upon which a
different treatment may be reasonably founded and that furnishes a practical
and real basis for discrimination.' 177 The court held that the act was arbi-
trary and a subterfuge. By not embracing all that should have been embraced
in the class, 178 it violated article 5, section 59 of the Oklahoma
constitution. 17
A similar, though not parallel, criticism may be applied to the revised
water statute. The point is advanced here to suggest that both mineral owners
and surface owners have real. and incorporeal property interests and that this
statute operates unfairly to favor one class-the surface owner-over the
other class-the mineral owner. Perhaps a better argument is whether the
revised statute operates in an arbitrary and capricious manner to deny these
rights. This should be examined in light of the stated legislative purpose of
the water law, i.e., whether the denial of rights serves the purpose for which
the statute was enacted. 180
The Ricks court made a strong statement: A mineral lessee's claim to
groundwater use as part of his estate is a vested right created by common
law. Once created, that right becomes absolute and is protected from
to a single subject in popular signification. Lowden v. Washita County Excise Bd., 188 Okla.
698, 113 P.2d 370, 371 (1941).
173. 408 P.2d 517 (Okla. 1965).
174. Id. at 520 (citing Roberts v. Ledgerwood, 134 Okla. 152, 272 P. 448, 450-51 (1928)).
175. 408 P.2d at 520.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Id. at 521.
179. Article 5, section 59 provides: "Laws of a general nature shall have a uniform operation
throughout the State, and where a general law can be made applicable, no special law shall be
enacted." OKLA. CONST. art. V, § 59. See also Oklahoma County Util. Serv. Auth. v. Corpora-
tion Comm'n, 519 P.2d 919 (Okla. 1974), where the court used the same constitutional provision
to strike down a statute giving the Corporation Commission the power to operate a public trust
in counties with more than 500,000 population, when only one county fit the necessary criteria.
180. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
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legislative invasion.'8 ' The cases examined show that right can be "invaded,"
however, if the state can justify its action as necessary for the public good.
Thus, an examination of the consequences of the act may be helpful.
It is questionable to assert that denying a mineral owner the right to apply
for a water permit has any rational basis, if one uses as a foundation the
aims of the Act.' 82 The ability of a surface owner to deny a mineral lessee the
right to a reasonable use of water does not further these same aims:
agricultural stability, beneficial uses, or the general economy, health, and
welfare of the state.1
83
That the aims of the Act must be taken into consideration are made clear
when one examines the problems that arise when the mineral owner is denied
the right to take water. The mechanics of oil and gas drilling dictate that a
mineral owner or lessee must use water. If he cannot get it free as part of the
benefits of his estate, he will pay for it, and only the most truculent of sur-
face owners would refuse to sell it to him at a price the owner feels is worth
its loss. The Act, while benefitting the surface owner, is a detriment to the
mineral owner. But if the surface owner sells fresh water to the mineral
owner to use in secondary and tertiary recovery operations, the water is lost
and the public is harmed, even though the surface owner is benefited. But in
neither of the above situations is the Act likely to noticeably change the
depletion rate of the state's groundwater supply. 84 Therefore, one cannot
truly say that the regulation benefits the general public. The only
beneficiaries of the statute are other private parties, the surface owners, who
will realize added income from the sale of their water. The general public
could also be hurt in other ways if, in the instance of a field deemed
speculative at best, the added cost of water could be a determining factor in a
decision not to drill.
In many of the water cases and almost all of the oil and gas cases, the ra-
tionale for a proper exercise of police power is prevention of waste.
However, for good or ill, the supreme court in Texas County Irrigation &
Water Resources Association, Inc. v. Cities Service Oil Co.'8I noted that the
use of fresh groundwater for secondary oil recovery projects was not waste
per se.' 86 In a case decided two months after Ricks, Oklahoma Water
Resources Board v. Texas County Irrigation & Water Resources Association
181. Ricks, 695 P.2d at 504.
182. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
183. 82 OIaA. STAT. § 1020.2 (1981). See also supra note 21 and accompanying text.
184. If conservation of water is a reason for the act, a more logical but highly unpopular con-
servation method would be to limit groundwater use for irrigation, especially in the Ogallala
Aquifer region of the Oklahoma panhandle. For example, it is estimated that a 10 percent reduc-
tion in water used for irrigation in the seventeen western states would accommodate a 100 per-
cent increase in all other uses. K. MEYER, D. PEDERSEN, N. THORSON & J. DAVIDSON, JR.,
AGRICULTuRAL Lp.w, CASES AND MATERIALS 825 (1985).
185. 570 P.24t 49 (Okla. 1977).
186. Id. at 51. The court referred to an Attorney General Opinion issued in 1967 (Okla. Op.
Att'y Gen. No. 67-159 (1967)) concluding that use of fresh groundwater for secondary oil
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(Mobil Oil Corp.),18 7 the court cited Cities Service and by analogy to second-
ary oil recovery, indicated that tertiary oil recovery may or may not be waste
per se. The court referred the case back to the Board for determination.'
Thus waste would generally not be a factor to consider in this case.
It is obvious that the most important factor is not whether the state can ex-
ercise its police powers to limit or deny the intersts of one party, but who will
be the recipient of those interests. As noted above, when the recipient is not
the public but a private party, both the state and federal supreme courts have
frowned upon such an exercise of police power.
The United States Supreme Court addressed a situation where the effect of
an order by a Texas regulatory agency would compel natural gas producers
with adequate transportation facilities to restrict their own production and
buy gas from producers who were without markets, thereby being prohibited
under regulations from producing gas. Thompson v. Consolidated Gas
Utilities Corp. struck down the order.8 9 Stating that a presumption of the
existence of facts justifying the exercise of power is given to all administra-
tive regulations made under legally delegated authority, the Court concluded
that orders were invalid if they bore no reasonable relation to protection of
correlative rights or prevention of waste, or if otherwise shown to be ar-
bitrary.' The Court continued: "[T]his Court has many times warned that
one person's property may not be taken for the benefit of another private
person without a justifying public purpose, even though compensation be
paid."' 9 '
The Oklahoma court stated the same philosophy in Grison Oil Corpora-
tion v. Corporation Commission. 92 Noting proper instances of invoking
police power, the court warned that while private rights must yield to the
power, "it is not contemplated that they be annihilated thereby, or that they
be interfered with to any greater extent than is reasonably required ... tak-
ing into consideration the legitimate object to be accomplished.' 193 Both
private rights and the public benefit are important factors.
Conclusion
In Ricks, the court interpreted the previous statute to avoid a constitu-
recovery was not per se waste. The court reasoned that because the legislature did not act when
the Water Resources Board used the opinion to formulate rules, the legislature intended to allow
use of fresh water for the recovery process.
187. 711 P.2d 38 (Okla. 1984).
188. For a discussion of Mobil Oil Corp. and its impact on oil recovery, see Note, Fresh
Groundwater and Tertiary Oil Recovery: Oklahoma Water Resources Board v. Texas County Ir-
rigation & Water Resources Association (Mobil Oil Corp.), 21 TULSA L.J. 565 (1986).
189. 300 U.S. 55 (1937).
190. Id. at 78.
191. Id. at 80.
192. 186 Okla. 548, 99 P.2d 134 (1940).
193. Id., 99 P.2d at 137. See also Peppers Ref. Co. v. Corporation Comm'n, 198 Okla. 451,
179 P.2d 899 (1947).
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tional question. That is proper. In so doing, the court avoided unnecessary
judicial activism. Its decision, however, required the OWRB to mediate con-
flicts between surface and mineral owners, a job the OWRB apparently did
not want. The change in the law reflects the Board's philosophy, as is
evidenced by the similar language in the new statute and the Board's prior
regulation.
Despite the justifiable reluctance of the court to hold a statute unconstitu-
tional, there appears to be little choice in this case. The Ricks court forcefully
declared that a mineral owner-here, one who had used no water in his
operations on this particular mineral estate-has a vested interest in the use
of fresh groundwater. The legislature then made an equally forceful state-
ment by changing the law to specifically exclude such owners.
It might be possible to avoid a constitutional dilemma by interpreting the
new statute as operating only prospectively. But in so doing, one must ques-
tion its effectiveness insofar as the stated aims of the Act are concerned. It is
likely that there were far more severed mineral estates and leases in existence
when the statute was modified than there will be new ones being prospec-
tively affected by the statutory change. To interpret the statute as operating
only prospectively would effectively emasculate the provision by limiting its
applicability. Nevertheless, absent such an interpretation or some creative
thinking-not impossible given the excellent wordsmiths on the court
today-a showdown seems inevitable. This showdown seems all the more in-
evitable when examining one paragraph in the Ricks case. The court quoted
subsection 1023.11(D) as it existed at the time and then said:
By interpreting this section to exclude owners of interests other
than surface from the allowable class of applicants, the Board in
effect has placed the mineral owner in the position of having to
bargain with the surface owner for what is recognized as his
common-law right of free access to reasonable use of groundwater
for oil and gas purposes. In order to reach the result sought by the
Board, we would have to conclude that the Act operates to alter
private common law rights of the mineral owner. We cannot so
hold." ,.
Dan Connally
194. Ricks, 695 P.2d at 504 (emphasis added).
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